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The issues involved in embryo donation/adoption are vast and
complex on scientific, ethical, and political levels. What an
1
embryo is and how it should be treated are hotly debated issues at
the forefront of reproductive science and the law. The opinions
are varied and diametric, from those who believe embryos are
solely cellular matter and should be treated as such, making them
eligible for “donation” such as one would donate a kidney or a

®
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1. Notwithstanding later discussion in this article regarding applicable
terminology and discussion regarding the definition of an embryo, for purposes of
clarity and ease of reference, the term embryo will be used herein to refer to any
fertilized human ova that has not been transferred to the uterus of a woman
and/or that has not obtained a level of cellular differentiation presented by
evidence of a primitive streak. See infra Part III for a discussion of stages of
embryonic development.
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liver, to those who believe each and every embryo is a living,
sentient being, and should therefore only be eligible for
“adoption.” Indeed, the debate is inflammatory and extremist; for
example, one religious authority, the Donum Vitae, has pronounced
that, notwithstanding the fact that it considers frozen embryos to
be human beings that should be afforded all rights and protections
accordant therewith, frozen embryos must be thawed and allowed
to die because they were created in an unnatural manner through
2
in vitro fertilization (IVF). Indeed, arguments such as the one set
forth by the Donum Vitae perhaps best encapsulate how divisive the
nature of the debate surrounding the disposition of frozen embryos
can get.
This article will analyze the legal and statutory models for the
disposition of cryopreserved embryos to a third party for purposes
of family building. Part I will present an overview of the debate and
its importance in the current legal, bioethical, and political
3
climate. Part II will present an overview of the “two” models for
disposition, donation and adoption, and will demonstrate that
other than through the different use of terminology, there is no
meaningful difference in the current methodology for disposing of
4
frozen embryos to third parties for purposes of family building.
Notwithstanding the fact, however, that from a practical standpoint
there may be no “real” distinction between embryo donation and
adoption, these contradictory paradigms and the concomitant
misapplication of terminology must be addressed and resolved if
the disposition of frozen embryos is going to provide a real and
substantial means for building new families in the future.
Thus, Part III will seek to define the term “embryo” by
analyzing the legal and scientific definitions afforded embryos to
date, and will discuss how state and federal law impact the

2. E.g., Karin A. Moore, Embryo Adoption: The Legal and Moral Challenges, 1 U.
ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 100, 117–19 (discussing the Donum Vitae’s position
on frozen embryos and in vitro fertilization, noting that “[w]hen the act of embryo
adoption is characterized as a wonderful gift to an infertile couple instead of
making the best possible situation out of an irresponsible moral choice, it
undermines the goal of stopping frozen embryos from being created in the first
place . . . .” and that “[t]hose opposing embryo adoption [in the right-to-life
Catholic community] believe the problem must be attacked going forward, and
that those lives already hanging in the frozen abyss must be allowed to die for the
greater good of an unequivocal stand against the practice of IVF.”).
3. See infra Part I.
4. See infra Part II.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss2/1

2

Falker: The Disposition of Cryopreserved Embryos: Why Embryo Adoption Is

2009]

THE DISPOSITION OF CRYOPRESERVED EMBRYOS

491

5

definition of an embryo. It will then propose a definition for the
term “embryo” that is consistent with existing jurisprudence and
science and will also provide ongoing stability for the disposition of
cryopreserved embryos for purposes of conception given the
6
current legal and constitutional environment. Part III will further
discuss how the definition of an embryo has the potential to
undermine existing procreative freedoms; and how the definition
of an embryo has been used intentionally in an effort to create a
backdoor approach to weaken procreative freedoms recognized in
7
8
Roe v. Wade and its progeny.
Part IV of this article will examine existing jurisprudential
theories regarding the termination of parental rights and how state
9
adoption laws and public policies impact an embryo adoption.
Finally, Part V will propose a model for the disposition of
cryopreserved embryos which is consistent both with existing legal
precedent as well as medical, ethical and normative ideas regarding
10
the disposition and donation of cellular matter and gametes. This
article argues that any application of the traditional adoption
model to the disposition of cryopreserved embryos is not only
inconsistent with the overwhelming body of U.S. legal
jurisprudence, but also that, from a normative and ethical
standpoint, such a paradigm also undermines and confuses the well
established protected interests of genetic/gestating birth parents.
In addition, such a paradigm propounds the fears and
vulnerabilities of the infertile population, whether due to medical
or social factors.
I.

THE DEBATE OVER THE DISPOSITION OF CRYOPRESERVED
EMBRYOS FOR FAMILY BUILDING

It is incongruous and iconoclastic that, as science hurdles
humanity forward into uncharted and once incomprehensible
5. See infra Part III.
6. It is the intent of this article to better define an embryo solely in the
context of the disposition of frozen embryos to third parties to create new family
units and to analyze the conflicting approaches taken by courts, legislatures, and
practitioners. This article does not attempt to address substantial moral questions
surrounding whether embryos are human beings or when life begins.
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994); Webster v.
Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part V.
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technologies involving the ability to create life and families, the law,
legal scholars, and bioethicists struggle to keep pace and to define
11
Reproductive technologies have
that life and those families.
served not only to offer new and faster means of creating families
for those who not twenty-five years ago might have remained
childless but have also simultaneously created one of the most
divisive and misunderstood discussions regarding the implications
and implementation of that technology. Had political invective not
taken such a large and overwhelming role in the early discussions
regarding the application of these new technologies, reasoned
minds and appropriate debate might have avoided much of the
current controversy regarding the disposition of cryopreserved
12
embryos.
Regardless of political debate (or lack thereof), however,
reproductive technology has advanced to the point where it is now
possible for a person or couple to conceive a child that lacks any
genetic connection to either or both of them and that is carried in
13
utero by neither of them. Through the combination of egg and
sperm donation and surrogacy, together with the improvement of
medical
protocols
for
achieving
controlled
ovarian
hyperstimulation and the culture medium used to support the
fertilized ovum, the medically and/or socially infertile American
has more options for parenthood and greater chances of success
than ever before. In the process, the infertile get to experience
pregnancy and express control over the uterine environment of
14
their growing offspring.
11. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 178 (N.Y. 1998) (“[A]s science races
ahead, it leaves in its trail mind-numbing ethical and legal questions.” (citation
omitted)).
12. European and Scandinavian countries debated and discussed these issues
throughout the evolution of the technologies being discussed herein, whereas the
response in the United States was to shut down funding for, and thus end, any
debate regarding scientific advances in fields like stem cell research. See, e.g.,
Susan L. Crockin, The “Embryo” Wars: At the Epicenter of Science, Law, Religion and
Politics, 39 FAM. L.Q. 599, 620–24 (2005) [hereinafter Crockin, The Embryo Wars].
13. Through the use of both an egg and sperm donor and a gestational
carrier, a recipient, or intended parent may have a child that lacks any genetic
connection with him or her, and may do so without going through an adoption
process. See, e.g., Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Collaborative Reproduction and Rethinking
Parentage, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 43, 47–50 (2008); see also CHARLES P.
KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: A
LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 1–25 (2006) [hereinafter
Kindregan & McBrien, Assisted Reproductive Technology].
14. E.g., Brandon S. Mercer, Embryo Adoption: Where are the Laws?, 26 J. JUV. L.
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As a well recognized byproduct of the success of the science of
in vitro fertilization, there now are an estimated 400,000
cryopreserved embryos stored in fertility clinics in the United States
15
These are the embryos that remain after a couple or
today.
individual has successfully undergone IVF, donor IVF, or a
gestational carrier arrangement (to name only a few of the possible
combinations for achieving parenthood utilizing third party
assisted reproduction). To date, the largest discussion of what to
do with these cryopreserved embryos has centered—at least in case
16
law—over disputes arising during divorce proceedings or after the
17
While not consistently
death of one of the genetic parents.
resolved among U.S. courts, there is a sufficient body of case law in
the United States to help couples address, ahead of time, issues
regarding disposition of frozen embryos upon divorce or regarding
18
children conceived posthumously. The existing body of case law
also can help them predict the outcome of any potential dispute
19
The
arising under such circumstances (divorce or death).
discussion, however, over how to dispose of cryopreserved embryos
for a third party’s family building—embryo donation or adoption—
is far from being as “settled” as is the law regarding custody or
20
inheritance disputes.
73, 74 (2006).
15. Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note 12, at 609 (discussing the number of
embryos in frozen storage); see also David I. Hoffman et al., Cryopreserved Embryos in
the United States and Their Availability for Research, 79 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1063,
1063–64 (2003) (stating that the exact number of stored embryos is not known
and ranges from tens of thousands to several hundred thousand). Indeed, as of
the date of this writing, the figure cited herein may well be higher as there have
been thousands of additional cycles of in vitro fertilization completed since the
statistics were first published, thereby raising the number of embryos
cryopreserved for future use.
16. E.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998);
In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d
1051 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001); Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 174;
In re Marriage of Dahl, 194 P.3d 834 (Or. Ct. App. 2008); Davis v. Davis, 842
S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); In re Marriage of Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).
17. E.g., Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
18. See cases cited supra notes 16–17.
19. See cases cited supra notes 16–17.
20. See, e.g., Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note 12; Charles P. Kindregan, Jr.
& Maureen McBrien, Embryo Donation: Unresolved Legal issues in the Transfer of
Surplus Cryopreserved Embryos, 49 VILL. L. REV. 169 (2004) [hereinafter Kindregan &
McBrien, Embryo Donation]; Jessica L. Lambert, Developing a Legal Framework for
Resolving Disputes Between “Adoptive Parents” of Frozen Embryos: A Comparison to
Resolutions of Divorce Disputes Between Progenitors, 49 B.C. L. REV. 529 (2008); Mercer,
supra note 14; Ann Marie Noonan, The Uncertainty of Embryo Disposition Law: How
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The argument over the best and most appropriate means for
disposing of these embryos encompasses complex discussions over
stem cell research, human cloning, and the rights of medically and
21
This article
socially infertile Americans to build their families.
does not attempt—nor does it need to, given the current laws
regarding research into stem cells or human cloning—to address
the moral, legal, or medical issues involved in using these frozen
22
embryos to further scientific research. Rather, this article focuses
23
on a rarely discussed and poorly understood distinction regarding
the disposition of these cryopreserved embryos solely for purposes
of family building—namely, an inherent conflict and confusion
over whether frozen embryos can and should be “donated” to
prospective parents or placed with those parents for purposes of
24
“adoption.”
At the heart of this poorly understood controversy lie
questions involving some of the most impassioned and justifiably
25
complicated questions to face the United States since Roe v. Wade
26
and its progeny.
The disposition of frozen embryos to nongenetically related parents for purposes of creating another family
implicates three critical debates which are inconsistently addressed
among state legislatures, federal and state jurists, legal scholars, bioethicists, and the United States Congress.
First and perhaps foremost, the issue of whether these embryos
can or should be donated to or adopted by the prospective parents
27
involves overarching notions of when life begins. If life begins at
Alterations to Roe Could Change Everything, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 485 (2007).
21. See, e.g., Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note 12.
22. E.g., id.
23. A brief survey of literature and case law reveals more argument on how to
dispose of cryopreserved embryos in the event of death or divorce than for
purposes of family building. See, e.g., supra notes 16–17, 20.
24. Indeed, the common interchangeable use of both terms (donation and
adoption) to describe two different legal processes for accomplishing the same
goal—the creation of a new family unit—serves to underscore how poorly
understood and analyzed this issue has become.
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
26. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994); Webster v. Reprod.
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
27. See, e.g., Susan L. Crockin, “What is an Embryo?”: A Legal Perspective, 36
CONN L. REV. 1177 (2004) [hereinafter Crockin, “What is an Embryo?”]; Kelly J.
Hollowell, Defining a Person Under the Fourteenth Amendment: A Constitutionally and
Scientifically Based Analysis, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 67 (2002); Ann A. Kiessling, What
is an Embryo?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1051 (2004); Kindregan & McBrien, Embryo
Donation, supra note 20; Robert L. Stenger, Embryos, Fetuses and Babies: Treated as
Persons and Treated With Respect, 2 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 33 (2006).
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fertilization, some commentators argue that an adoption model
must be utilized for disposition of these embryos to create a new
28
Significant practical roadblocks exist, however, to the
family.
application of an adoption model, as the vast majority of states do
29
If,
not permit the pre-birth termination of parental rights.
instead, these frozen embryos are not to be afforded protection
30
31
either as “potential life” or as “juridical persons,” other
commentators argue that the donation model becomes more
persuasive and practical, enabling frozen embryos to be donated to
third parties without concerns regarding the pre-birth termination
32
of parental rights.
Thus, the first and most critical question
presented is: what legal status can or should be attributed to a
fertilized human ovum that has been cryogenically preserved?
It is important to note that so confusing and complicated is
this determination that even scientists do not always agree on or
use the same terminology when referring to fertilized human
33
eggs. The terms zygote, pre-embryo, preembyro, embryo, among
others, have all been used to describe what is typically understood
by the layman as an embryo that possesses the capability of growing
into a fetus and later a newborn baby. Clarification at both the
scientific and legal levels is essential to understanding the next two
34
questions encompassed by this debate.
28. E.g., Moore, supra note 2; Mercer, supra note 14.
29. See infra Part IV.
30. E.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (discussing
treatment and status of embryos under the law and holding that cryopreserved
embryos occupy an “interim category” between that of persons and property and
thus should be afforded “special respect” due to their “potential for human life.”).
31. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:123–33 (2008) (stating that an in vitro fertilized
human ovum is a juridical and biological person under Louisiana law).
32. See Olga Batsedis, Embryo Adoption: A Science Fiction of an Alternative to
Traditional Adoption?, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 565 (2003); Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra
note 12; Kindregan & McBrien, Embryo Donation, supra note 20; Stenger, supra note
27.
33. See, e.g., Crockin, “What is An Embryo?”, supra note 27, at 1177–78
(describing cellular stages and differentiation of the preembryo and application of
terminology thereto); Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 592–94 (discussing scientific
testimony regarding the stages of embryonic development and application of
appropriate terminology thereto); Howard W. Jones, Jr. & Lucinda Veeck, What is
an Embryo?, 77 FERTILITY & STERILITY 658, 659 (2002).
34. For purposes of clarity, although not ignoring the substantial debate over
what proper term should be utilized when describing and discussing a fertilized
human ovum, see supra note 1, for simplicity the author has chosen to use the term
embryo when referring to the cryopreserved embryos that are the subject of the
discussion set forth herein.
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Depending on how one defines these cryopreserved embryos
for legal purposes, the next question revolves around what legal
rights, if any, they may have. Unfortunately, state legislatures and
jurists have accepted differing interpretations of those legal rights
and have created divergent and inconsistent laws regarding the
rights to be granted these frozen embryos. This has created
conflicting and contradictory models for courts, lawyers, and
medical professionals to attempt to follow when seeking to create a
new family through the disposition of cryopreserved embryos.
Serving to complicate and escalate the debate even further are the
implications these contradictory schemes present when considered
in light of the United States Supreme Court’s determination that
women have a degree of procreative autonomy that permits them
to terminate an otherwise viable pregnancy within certain delicately
35
balanced protections and circumstances. To wit, a woman may
not terminate her pregnancy if the fetus she is carrying has reached
a degree of gestational development since it is considered to be a
viable life independent of the womb and woman in which it has
36
been growing. The determination of what these frozen embryos
are or should be considered from a scientific and/or legal
standpoint, and the existing body of legal jurisprudence that seeks
to inform or enable the process of creating a new family unit
through the disposition of frozen embryos, implicates a woman’s
ability to terminate her pregnancy as provided by Roe v. Wade and
37
its progeny.
Indeed, efforts by the Louisiana legislature, which has defined
a frozen embryo to be a juridical person who must be placed for
adoption, arguably attempt to circumvent a woman’s right to
choose abortion and may very well be subject to constitutional
38
challenge. The debate over Roe v. Wade and the inherent fragility
35. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994); Webster v. Reprod.
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36. Commentators have noted that as science changes the time at which a
fetus is viable outside the uterus of a woman, the protections afforded by Roe are
reduced. See Hollowell, supra note 27, at 85.
37. Insofar as the definition of an embryo as a person could be deemed to be
placing undue burdens or obstacles in the path to abortion, it is arguably an
unconstitutional definition. E.g., Casey, 510 U.S. at 1309; Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 602
(noting that the gamete provider and/or the embryo’s rights when compared to
the state’s interest in protecting a non viable fetus is not sufficiently compelling to
allow it to interfere with a person’s procreational autonomy and therefore the
state’s interest in a lesser developed embryo cannot be paramount).
38. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1 (2008).
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of the decision in the current political climate cannot be
overlooked as part of the discussion over the means by which
cryopreserved embryos can or may be used to create a family, as the
legal protection afforded embryos either drives or diffuses much of
pro-life debate.
Thus, the definition given to embryos determines, for
purposes of legal debate, two paradigms or methods for disposing
of frozen embryos to recipient families who wish to procreate using
the frozen embryos. On one end of the spectrum are the pro-life
proponents of embryo adoption who advance the definition of an
embryo as a person and argue that only an adoption model serves
39
the best interests of the child in the creation of a new family unit.
According to these theorists, in order to protect the unborn
embryo, the recipient or prospective adoptive parents should go
through a traditional adoption process including obtaining a home
40
study and child abuse and criminal background clearances prior
to the thawing and transfer of the frozen embryo to the prospective
adoptive mother’s uterus. On the other end of the debate are
those commentators and jurists who believe embryos should be
deemed to be “cellular matter” and thus are the legal “property” of
the genetic parents to be disposed of as they would dispose of other
41
property under the law, by contract. These theorists posit that
frozen embryos and parental rights should be transferred by
contract, as is commonly done for the donation of human eggs to
42
recipient parents.
In the middle are those who believe embryos should be
afforded special status and some form of interim protection
43
because of their unique capability to give rise to new human life.
44
In the seminal case of Davis v. Davis, the court held that embryos
should be afforded a special or interim status under the law due to
their potential for life. It is unclear how the special or interim
status afforded embryos by the Davis court impacts the disposition
of a frozen embryo to third parties, except to note that if a
39.
40.

See infra text accompanying notes 68–71.
See ELIZABETH SWIRE FALKER, THE ULTIMATE INSIDER’S GUIDE TO ADOPTION:
EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION
(Warner 2006) (chapter three discussing the home study process).
41. See, e.g., Batsedis, supra note 32, at 567; Kindregan & McBrien, Embryo
Donation, supra note 20, at 185–88; Stenger, supra note 27, at 59.
42. E.g., Batsedis, supra note 32, at 567; Stenger, supra note 27, at 59.
43. E.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 588 (Tenn. 1992).
44. Id.
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donation/contract model is applied, the Davis standard arguably
would provide the genetic parents the right to revoke consent up
until the time of the embryo transfer procedure, if not later, based
on the constitutional protection that one cannot be forced to
45
The interim “special status” may
procreate against one’s will.
further implicate Roe v. Wade in that it may interfere with a
woman’s right to exercise procreative freedom.
46
The definition of an embryo under the law thus clearly
defines the means by which frozen embryos can be used by third
parties for purposes of conception. If an embryo is a person, then
arguably the best interests standard and a traditional adoption
model should apply. In contrast, if the embryo is property, then
the contractual donation of the embryo to a third party is
permissible and should be binding. Thus, the debate over the
terms “embryo adoption” and “embryo donation” has arisen largely
due to the lack of consistency being applied to the definition of
embryo from a legal standpoint.
Importantly however, when the actual manner in which frozen
embryos are currently being provided to recipient parents is
examined, it becomes clear that much of the debate over embryo
donation and embryo adoption is semantic. That is, current
practice even among embryo adoption agencies is to follow a
contractual or donation model for transferring parental rights of
47
the unborn frozen embryo to the recipient parents.
II. THE “TYPICAL” EMBRYO ADOPTION/DONATION IN THE UNITED
STATES
Upon close inspection it is clear that the concept of embryo
adoption/donation is largely a semantic distinction. For example,
Snowflakes Adoption Agency in Fullerton, California, which is one
45. Id. at 592; see also Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note 12, at 613 (noting
that the non-forced procreation line of cases indicate that embryo donation
contracts would be subject to challenge up until the time of transfer if following
the “special status” standard for defining an embryo).
46. It should be noted that the discussion set forth herein is limited to
whether an embryo should be deemed a person under the law and not to the
larger ethical question of whether an embryo is a life form or a human life. See
Stenger, supra note 27, at 65–67.
47. E.g., Batsedis, supra note 32; see also Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note
12, at 611 (noting that “[m]ost who promote the ‘adoption’ terminology
acknowledge that they are not referring to adoption in a legal sense, and no court
procedure is involved as in legal adoption.”).
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of the most recognized “embryo adoption agencies” nationwide,
does not follow the traditional adoption model when making an
48
Snowflakes operates in the state of
embryo adoption plan.
California where there are no regulations governing embryo
49
Accordingly, when making an embryo available for
adoption.
adoption to recipient parents, Snowflakes uses a contract model to
govern the rights and responsibilities of the parties involved in its
50
Snowflakes calls its contract an “adoption
embryo adoptions.
agreement,” and it relinquishes the rights of the genetic parents
51
over the embryos. Snowflakes does not require the participants to
its embryo adoptions to execute a surrender or relinquishment of
parental rights under California law post-birth, instead relying on
its adoption agreement to terminate the rights of the genetic
52
parents pre-birth. This contract further provides that the embryo,
if live born, will take the name of the adoptive parents and have
53
inheritance rights only through the adoptive parents.
Additionally, in contrast to a traditional domestic newborn
adoption, in a Snowflake embryo adoption, the genetic parents
54
cannot change their minds. Before the embryos are provided to
the adoptive parents for purposes of undergoing an embryo
transfer procedure, the genetic parent must sign a legal document
55
terminating their “ownership rights” to the embryos. Snowflakes
gives the genetic parents three days to change their mind after
56
execution of the adoption agreement. Once the embryos have
been transferred to the uterus of the recipient mother, the genetic
parents no longer have any legal rights or responsibilities with
57
In the event there is a
respect to the transferred embryo(s).
dispute regarding the embryo adoption, the adoption agreement
provides further that “this is a property exchange in the case that
58
this goes before a court of law.” Thus, in its own embryo adoption
agreement, Snowflakes itself acknowledges that it is not conducting
48. Batsedis, supra note 32, at 570.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. n.92.
54. Id. at 570.
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing Nightlight Christian Adoptions, http://www.nightlight.org/
snowflakefaqs.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2008)).
57. See id.
58. Batsedis, supra note 32, at 571, n.100.
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an adoption but rather is engaging in a “transaction involving
59
property, not persons.”
Similarly, Adoptions From The Heart, a well established
adoption agency located on the east coast of the United States,
acknowledges that its “Embryo Placement Program” involves the
application of contract law and does not involve traditional
60
In its promotional brochures entitled
principles of adoption.
“Heartbeats: Embryo Donation Services, Donors: Give the Gift of
Family” and “Recipient Families: Experience the Miracle of
61
Childbirth,” Adoptions From The Heart makes it clear that in its
program for the disposition of cryopreserved embryos to third
parties for purposes of their conception, the parties will be
entering into a contract and not an adoption:
[A] contract is signed and notarized by the donating
couple authorizing the embryo donation. Once this
informed consent has been signed, the donors have no
legal claim to either the embryos or any children who may
be born as a result of the donation, nor do they hold any
responsibility for the embryos or any future children who
62
may be born as a result of the donation.
The brochure for donating parents goes on to point out that:
[E]mbryo donation is not considered an adoption even
though many agencies call it Embryo Adoption. Embryo
donation is governed by contract law, not adoption law
and all federal, state and local laws may apply. In
addition, regulations by the US Food and Drug
Administration related to human tissue donation are
63
applicable.
Thus, while commentators have opined and contributed to the
controversy surrounding the application of the adoption model to
59. Id.
60. Adoptions trom the Heart, Heartbeats: Embryo Placement Program,
http://adoptionsfromthehear1-px.rtrk.com/heartbeats/index.html (last visited
Dec. 3, 2008).
61. HEARTBEATS: EMBRYO DONATION SERVS., DONORS GIVE THE GIFT OF FAMILY
(Adoptions from the Heart 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter HEARTBEATS –
DONORS]; see also HEARTBEATS: EMBRYO DONATION SERVS., RECIPIENT FAMILIES:
EXPERIENCE THE MIRACLE OF CHILDBIRTH (Adoptions from the Heart 2008) (on file
with author) [hereinafter HEARTBEATS – FAMILIES]. The Heartbeats embryo
donation program is administered and run by Adoptions from the Heart, a
licensed adoption agency in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Connecticut,
Virginia, and West Virginia.
62. HEARTBEATS – FAMILIES, supra note 61.
63. HEARTBEATS – DONORS, supra note 61.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss2/1

12

Falker: The Disposition of Cryopreserved Embryos: Why Embryo Adoption Is

2009]

THE DISPOSITION OF CRYOPRESERVED EMBRYOS

501

the disposition of cryopreserved embryos for purposes of creating a
new family unit, it is clear that the practical application and
administration of this means of family building is predominantly
being conducted based on principles of contract and property
64
While Snowflakes may require its recipient families to
law.
undergo an adoption home study and a child abuse clearance, as is
typical in a domestic adoption, it does not apply state adoption laws
to the process. As noted above, Adoptions From The Heart clearly
states that “embryo donation is not considered an adoption even
65
though many agencies call it Embryo Adoption.”
Indeed, it would appear that this debate may largely arise over
misapplication of terminology or the intentional confusion (or
obfuscation) of terms by pro-life proponents. In one advertisement
placed by Nightlight Christian Adoptions (Snowflakes) in support
of a campaign to raise awareness of embryo adoption as a means
for building families, it is stated:
[L]ive Your Dream. Experience the joy of pregnancy and
give birth to your adopted child through embryo
66
adoption.
As will be discussed in greater detail in Part IV, it is impossible
under state law to adopt a child to whom you have given birth. In
most states, well established common law presumptions provide
that a woman who gives birth to a child will be deemed the legal
67
It is thus impossible for a
and natural mother of that child.
woman to adopt a child she has given birth to, as the law already
recognizes her to be the mother of that child. It is thus
oxymoronic and nonsensical to think that one can give birth to
their own adopted child as this advertisement asserts.
Additionally, in more than one law review article reviewed by
the author, terms such as adoption and donation, and donee and
parent, were used interchangeably with no understanding of the
68
distinction or the need for a distinction between the terms.
Whether intentional or not, the failure of any legal commentator to
64. See, e.g., id.
65. HEARTBEATS – DONORS, supra note 61.
66. Nightlight Christian Adoptions, Embryo Adoption Awareness Advertisement:
“Live Your Dream,” ADOPTIVE FAMILIES MAGAZINE, Feb. 2009 (advertisement placed
in the inside front cover, with support from grant #1EAAPA081009-01-00 from the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, promotes uses the language
“embryo adoption”) (on file with author).
67. Infra p. 512 and note Error! Bookmark not defined..
68. See generally Moore, supra note 2.
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draw any distinctions between adoption and donation with respect
to the disposition of frozen embryos to third parties for purposes of
their conception is instructive. In a Christian response to the
growing trend of embryo adoption/donation, one commentator
repeatedly used the terms adoption and donation interchangeably
when arguing that:
[E]mbryo adoption is the pro-life community’s attempt to
counteract a growing disrespect for life by infusing a sense
of humanity into the human embryo. Even if this
situation were not morally contestable, given their
underlying goal, supporters of embryo adoption need to be
working to pass legislation that will legitimize the practice
of embryo adoption in the courts. Though disputed cases
have not yet touched on this area, disputed embryos
between donating parties have consistently been destroyed
when one party objects to previously consented use. The
current case law would suggest there is no respect for the
69
life of the embryo in today’s courts.
Regardless of whether the distinction between embryo
adoption and embryo donation is semantic, clarification of the
terms and the laws as they apply to this process is necessary in order
to make embryo donation/adoption a continued means of family
building and in order to preserve the procreational autonomy as
70
outlined in Roe and its progeny, which may well be at risk. In fact,
as two commentators, Charles Kindregan and Maureen McBrien,
have pointed out, “The longer the process is called embryo
adoption, and the more common the phrase becomes, the more
society may view embryos as persons entitled to legal protection.
This view would challenge the basic premise of the right to choose
71
Thus, these contradictory
abortion without state interference.”
paradigms and the concomitant misapplication of terminology
must be addressed and resolved if the disposition of frozen
embryos to genetically unrelated third parties is going to provide a
real and substantial means for building new families in the future.

69. Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
70. See Kindregan & McBrien, Embryo Donation, supra note 20, at 175
(describing that terminology being used is inconsistent and that even if “[v]iewed
as a mere cosmetic change, the use of these terms will not affect the reality of what
is happening, but could impact public acceptance or rejection of the
procedure.”).
71. Id. at 188–89.
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III. DEFINING THE TERM EMBRYO
Scientists and legal scholars alike have been arguing for several
years that a better definition of the term “embryo” is necessary to
provide clarity for ongoing scientific research into stem cell lines
and human cloning, and for clear resolution of legal disputes
72
regarding frozen embryos. Focusing, for purposes of this article,
solely on the legal definition to be attributed to the term “embryo,”
cases and statutes have presented conflicting definitions of what
73
constitutes an embryo. Indeed, more than one commentator has
noted that the single term “embryo” is inadequate to address the
myriad of issues raised from the creation of embryos through
74
assisted reproductive technologies. This article will not attempt to
restate the overwhelming number of publications that have
analyzed this issue and/or the significance of those arguments with
respect to stem cell research. Rather, it will attempt to provide an
overview of the definitions presented in legal comments and cases,
and propose a working definition that best fits within the existing
constitutional framework.
It is well established that a fertilized human egg undergoes a
dramatic evolution from the time it is first fertilized, through the
process of implantation in the uterine wall to the growth and
75
development of a fetus, and ultimately the birth of a child. Of
note is the significant distinction to be made between the preimplantation embryo (sometimes referred to as a pre-embryo
among other terms) and the post-implantation embryo. This
distinction is important because of the developmental milestones
that take place both prior to and after implantation of the
76
embryo. The events of the first few days of the fertilized egg’s
existence are characteristic of rapid change and a high rate of
attrition, or death, among the fertilized eggs. This “preembryonic”
period has been characterized as turbulent, with conservative
estimates of at least two-thirds of all in vitro fertilized eggs having
abnormalities resulting in the arrest in the development of the
72. See, e.g., Crockin, “What is an Embryo?”, supra note 27, at 1177–81;
Kindregan & McBrien, Embryo Donation, supra note 20, at 175; Jones & Veeck, supra
note 33, at 659.
73. See Kiessling, supra note 27, at 1067–72.
74. Id. at 1092.
75. See, e.g., Jones & Veeck, supra note 33, at 658–59; Kiessling, supra note 27,
at 1052; Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Tenn. 1992).
76. Jones & Veeck, supra note 33, at 658.
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77

embryo.
During this early time, the first few days after
78
Until the
fertilization, identical twinning may occur.
development of the “primitive streak” at or about fourteen days
post fertilization, there is no guarantee that a single individual will
79
ultimately result from the fertilized ovum. “The primitive streak
guarantees biological individuation and terminates the preembryonic
80
period.” The subsequent few days and weeks of the “embryonic
period” are marked by the appearance of fundamental tissues and
organs; at or around eight weeks post fertilization the embryo
81
transitions into the fetal period. Just prior to the commencement
of the fetal period, a heartbeat may be detected on ultrasound,
thus distinguishing a “chemical” pregnancy from a “clinical”
82
pregnancy. Thus, scientists have identified three distinct phases
of development: the fertilized egg to the preembryo, the
83
preembryo to the embryo, and the embryo to the fetus. Scientists
further argue that there is quite simply no “embryo” before the
primitive streak forms and that terms “preembryo” and “embryo”
84
are distinctly and biologically different stages of development.
Furthermore, two aspects of these developmental periods
mark significant changes in the likelihood that the embryo or fetus
will result in a live birth. The first occurs during the preembryonic
period when the preembryo achieves a level of cellular
development known as the blastocyst stage. In the in vitro
fertilization community, preembryos that reach blastocyst
development are considered more likely to result in a pregnancy
85
than early stage preembryos. Indeed, blastocyst transfers are now
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 659.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
See, e.g., ELIZABETH SWIRE FALKER, THE INFERTILITY SURVIVAL HANDBOOK:
EVERYTHING YOU NEVER THOUGHT YOU’D NEED TO KNOW 50 (2004). A chemical
pregnancy is a pregnancy established by the presence of human chorionic
gonadotropin (HcG) in the blood or urine of the mother. A significant number
of chemical pregnancies spontaneously abort, sometimes even before the
pregnancy has been detected. A clinic pregnancy is a pregnancy that is established
by the presence of a fetal sac on ultrasound, the presence of a fetal pole, and a
heartbeat. Once the heartbeat is detected at or around six to eight weeks
gestation, the risk of spontaneous abortion diminishes significantly. Id. at 50–51.
83. Jones & Veeck, supra note 33, at 659.
84. Id.; see also Kiessling, supra note 27, at 1088–89; Crockin, What is an
Embryo?, supra note 27, at 1178–79 n.6.
85. SWIRE FALKER, supra note 82, at 224–26.
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a common means of reducing the risk of high order multiple
pregnancies in the IVF patient, as physicians are able to select only
86
one or two blastocysts for embryo transfer. The second significant
demarcation occurs at or around six weeks of embryonic
development, when a heartbeat may be detected on ultrasound.
The establishment of a heartbeat distinguishes a “chemical”
pregnancy from a “clinical” pregnancy and with it a significantly
87
reduced chance of miscarriage. The preembryo, whether frozen
at blastocyst stage or earlier, or transferred to the mother’s uterus
instead of being frozen, is not guaranteed to result in the detection
88
Many preembryos that are
of a pregnancy or a live birth.
transferred to the mother’s uterus on either day three postfertilization or as a blastocyst do not implant in the uterine wall
thus resulting in a negative pregnancy test, or implant in the
uterine wall but, for any number of reasons from chromosomal
abnormalities to uterine environmental issues, do not continue to
89
grow to the fetal stage or result in a live birth.
The frozen embryo that is the subject of the instant discussion
and has not yet developed a primitive streak, may also not have
achieved blastocyst development (although many preembryos are
now being frozen at the blastocyst stage of development), and
most certainly has not developed to a point where cellular
individuation can be determined and pregnancy diagnosed with
any degree of reliability. Thus, frozen embryos that may be
available for transfer and are the subject of this article arguably fall
within the scientific definition of a preembryo.
Just as scientists failed to develop a clear terminology for the
90
development of the human embryo, judges and state legislatures
have also struggled with the definition of an embryo. During the
1970s and following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Roe
91
v.Wade, several states enacted statutes which sought to prevent
92
tampering or experimentation on a fetus. Many of these statutes
used the terms “embryo” and “fetus” interchangeably whether it

86. Id. at 146, 226.
87. Id. at 50.
88. Kiessling, supra note 27, at 1061–62.
89. Id. at 1058–62, 1087–89; Jones & Veeck, supra note 33, at 659.
90. Kiessling, supra note 27, at 1088–89.
91. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
92. See Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note 12, at 603–04; see also MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12J (West 2003).
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was in context of fetal homicide or scientific research. Louisiana
defines an embryo as a juridical person who may be available for
adoptive implantation and has all the rights afforded persons in
94
Louisiana. Of those states which have embryo donation statutes,
the term embryo is often used without a clear statutory definition,
95
Florida is the only state to use a
thus furthering confusion.
definition most clearly aligned with the scientific analysis presented
herein, using the term “preembryo” and defining it as the product
of an egg fertilized by a sperm prior to the appearance of the
96
“embryonic axis.”
Case law further muddies the waters by providing numerous
and conflicting analyses of the status of frozen embryos and the
protections to which they are entitled, dependent largely on the
jurisdiction and issue presented. Most instructive are the cases
involving disputes between divorcing progenitors regarding the
disposition of their frozen embryos. In one of two seminal cases
involving the disposition of frozen embryos during a divorce, the
97
Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis sought to resolve
conflicting requests between progenitors regarding their frozen
embryos. The wife sought to have the embryos transferred to her
uterus in a post-divorce effort to conceive a child, while the
husband objected and sought to have the frozen embryos remain
in storage until such time as he determined whether he wanted to
98
parent a child outside of their marriage. While noting that Roe v.
Wade does not recognize embryos to be persons within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court in Davis held that
embryos are entitled to some interim, or “special protection” due
93. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18–4016 (2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112 §
12J (West 2003) (“[F]or purposes of this section, the word ‘fetus’ shall include also
an embryo or neonate.”).
94. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121, -123 (2008). Indeed, it is arguable that
Louisiana’s definition of an embryo is unconstitutional insofar as it denies a
pregnant woman the procreational freedom granted in Roe. This statute is further
objectionable in that a physician could arguably be subject to fetal homicide
charges if she or he inadvertently thaws and allows an embryo to die prior to
transfer to a uterus. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tenn. 1992)
(discussing lower court’s ruling that would have afforded preembryos “the legal
status of persons and vested them with legally cognizable interests separate from
those of their progenitors.”).
95. Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note 12, at 603–04.
96. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 742.13–14 (West 2005); accord Crockin, The Embryo
Wars, supra note 12, at 604.
97. 842 S.W.2d at 589.
98. Id.
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99

to their potential for creating human life. Noting that the couple
had not executed any written agreements regarding the disposition
of any cryopreserved embryos with their infertility clinic and that
100
Tennessee lacked any statute governing such disposition, the
Davis court undertook a thorough review of both case law and
scientific literature. Further noting that the issue presented was a
101
the court looked to extensive
matter of first impression,
102
Rejecting a property
commentary in legal and medical journals.
analysis, the Davis court applied a balancing test which weighed the
interests of each of the parties, taking into consideration their
103
While also noting that embryos cannot be
procreative rights.
104
considered persons under Tennessee law, the court concluded—
based largely on the scientific opinion of one expert and an ethics
opinion from the American Fertility Society (now known as the
American Society for Reproductive Medicine)—that embryos are
neither person nor property but rather “occupy an interim
category that entitles them to special respect because of their
105
potential for human life.”
In contrast, the New York State Court of Appeals case Kass v.
106
Kass, which is factually similar to Davis, involved a dispute over
cryopreserved embryos during a divorce. In that case, Chief Justice
Kaye enforced a divorcing couple’s prior written agreement to
donate any frozen embryos to scientific research in the event they
divorced, as set forth in consent documents they executed with
their fertility clinic prior to undergoing in vitro fertilization
107
This was decided over the objections of the mother who
(IVF).
wanted to use the frozen embryos for conception and the father’s
108
objections to being forced into unwanted parenthood. The court
99. Id. at 596.
100. Id. at 590.
101. Id. at 589.
102. Id. at 590–91.
103. Id. at 603–04.
104. Id. at 594–95.
105. Id. at 597; see also A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 2000)
(following Davis and upholding in divorce dispute one parent's right not to
procreate using cryopreserved embryos over competing claim from other genetic
parent); Kindregan & McBrien, Embryo Donation, supra note 20, at 188 ("[I]n A.Z.
v. B.Z., a Massachusetts court agreed with the Davis analysis, at least with respect to
the classification of cryopreserved embryos in an interim category between
personhood and property, ruling that embryos are deserving of special respect.").
106. 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
107. Id at 175.
108. Id.
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expressed a “need for clear, consistent principles to guide parties in
protecting their interests and resolving their disputes, and the need
for particular care in fashioning such principles as issues are better
109
The court next considered whether
defined and appreciated.”
the procreational rights of either party or any protected interest of
the frozen embryo would override the consent documents signed
110
111
Citing Roe v. Wade, the court
by the parties at the IVF clinic.
noted that disposition of these frozen embryos neither implicated
issues of privacy or bodily integrity in the area of reproductive
freedom, nor were the “pre-zygotes recognized as ‘persons’ for
112
Thus, the court held that the relevant
constitutional purposes.”
inquiry turned on who had dispositional authority over the frozen
embryos, which was clearly articulated in the parties’ agreement
signed at the time they entered into the IVF process at their fertility
113
The court thus specifically declined to decide whether
clinic.
114
embryos are entitled to “special respect” as set forth in Davis.
Instead, the embryos were donated to science in accordance with
115
the consent documents the parties’ signed with the IVF clinic.
Although not expressly stated in Kass, the court arguably followed a
property analysis in determining how the parties intended to
dispose of their cryopreserved embryos.
Other cases are informative although far less instructive as to
whether cryopreserved embryos are considered persons or property
under the law, or afforded some interim status as articulated in
116
Davis. In York v. Jones, the court attempted to resolve a dispute
between a couple undergoing IVF at a clinic in Virginia regarding
who possessed control over cryopreserved embryos. When the
couple moved to California, they sought to have their frozen
embryos transferred to a local fertility clinic for use in an embryo
117
The clinic in Virginia refused to release the
transfer procedure.
109. Id. at 179.
110. Id.
111. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The court also cited Bryn v. New York City Health &
Hosp. Corp., 286 N.E.2d 887, 890 (1972), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 949 (1972).
112. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 179.
113. Id. “The central issue is whether the consents clearly express the parties’
intent regarding disposition of the pre-zygotes in the present circumstances.” Id.
at 180.
114. Id. at 179.
115. The court concluded that the parties intended to donate the embryos for
research purposes. Id. at 182.
116. 717 F.Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
117. Id. at 424–25.
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118

embryos.
Relying on theories of property and bailment, the
119
Without analyzing or
court held in favor of the parents.
considering the definition of a frozen embryo or what protected
interests it may have, the court assumed that the embryos were the
couple’s property and ordered their release to the California
120
Consistent with the decision in York, the court in Hecht v.
clinic.
121
Superior Court held that sperm was property within the meaning of
the California probate code noting, however, that its value lies in its
122
potential to create a child after fertilization, growth, and birth.
Additionally, in In re Marriage of Witten, the Iowa Supreme
Court found that embryos are not children and therefore the best
123
interest of the child standard did not apply to embryos. In Jeter v.
124
Mayo Clinic Arizona, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed a
lower court’s decision that a cryopreserved, three-day-old, eightcelled “pre-embryo” was not a “person” for purposes of recovery
125
under Arizona’s wrongful death statute.
Thus, depending on the jurisdiction and the interest or issue
126
presented, embryos may be considered property or have no
127
The interim standard of
constitutionally protected interests.
affording frozen embryos “special respect,” however, has been
128
applied in Massachusetts, where the court in A.Z. v. B.Z applied
the interim standard and avoided having to address two
inconsistent, and arguably inapplicable, areas of the law: child
129
In addition, several
custody and personal property.
118. Id. at 424.
119. Id. at 425, 427. The court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and
ruled that the plaintiffs stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. at
427.
120. Id. at 424–25.
121. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
122. Id. at 283 (discussing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992)).
123. 672 N.W.2d 768, 775 (Iowa 2003).
124. 121 P.3d 1256 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
125. Id. at 1259, 1261; see also Miller v. Am. Infertility Group of Ill., No. 1-053202, 2008 WL 4722566 (Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 24, 2008) (holding that although the
Illinois Wrongful Death Act provides recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus, a
blastocyst or embryo created through in vitro fertilization does not fall within the
purview of that act).
126. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275;
York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
127. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Jeter, 121 P.3d at 1256; Witten, 672
N.W.2d at 768; Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 174.
128. 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
129. See Kindregan & McBrien, Embryo Donation, supra note 20, at 188 (“[I]n
A.Z. v. B.Z., a Massachusetts court agreed with the Davis analysis, at least with
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commentators have noted that the interim standard set forth in
Davis and followed in A.Z. v. B.Z. will “insulate abortion rights from
130
legal attack on the basis that embryos are persons.”
From a statutory standpoint, while some states such as
Louisiana have codified the definition of an embryo to mean a
131
juridical person, other states have expressed that embryos are
132
property and recognize the recipient/intended parents as the
legal and natural parents of the child conceived from the embryo
133
134
The Uniform Parentage Act and the American Bar
donation.
Association’s Proposed Model Act on Assisted Reproductive
Technologies both define an embryo as property subject to the
135
The American Society for
disposition by its progenitors.
136
Reproductive Medicine further supports this view.
It is clear that embryos are not persons within any
interpretation of the law save isolated state statutes that are
137
arguably subject to substantial constitutional challenge.
Moreover, given the fact that most cryopreserved embryos will not
ultimately give rise to life—indeed the special respect standard is
based on the presumption of the possibility of life—and given that
the cryopreserved embryo has yet to clearly distinguish or
individuate into something more closely resembling life, assigning
special respect to frozen embryos may ultimately undermine efforts
to utilize these embryos for family building with non-genetically
related parents and undermine constitutional notions of
personhood.
Embryos are comprised of living cellular matter, but absent the
existence of a primitive streak and the successful implantation of
the embryo in the uterus and/or the presence of a heartbeat, there

respect to the classification of cryopreserved embryos in an interim category
between personhood and property.”).
130. E.g., id. at 189.
131. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121, 9:123 (2008).
132. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 554–55 (2007); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§§ 160.702–.707 (2002).
133. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 554–55 (2007); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§§ 160.702–.707 (2002).
134. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2000), 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001).
135. E.g., id.; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, § 603; http://www.abanet.org/family/committees/
ART_MOD_050506Draft.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2008).
136. Batsedis, supra note 32, at 567.
137. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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138

is no possibility for the embryo to have life.
It has been noted,
“[i]mplantation and the development of an embryonic disc is a
139
The
more accurate requirement for [defining] embryo status.”
danger inherent in assigning qualities of personhood, even special
respect, based on an incalculable likelihood that a given
cryopreserved embryo will result in a live birth, when weighed
against the well established procreative freedoms of both men and
women and the constitutional right not to procreate, militates
against defining an embryo as anything other than property.
IV. EMBRYO ADOPTION, PARENTAL AND PROCREATIVE RIGHTS.
Importantly, while the definition and status of an embryo
cannot be ignored as part of the discussion regarding the
appropriate disposition of cryopreserved embryos to third parties,
one cannot overlook the significant inherent conflict presented by
the traditional adoption model and issues regarding the
termination of parental rights. Forty-nine of the fifty United States
do not permit a biological mother (typically a pregnant birth
mother) to terminate her parental rights until after the birth of the
140
Although state laws vary more widely, birth fathers are
child.
similarly and routinely afforded a legal right to parent their
141
Thus, adoption law cannot and should not be applied
children.
138. See supra notes 72–89 and accompanying text.
139. Kiessling, supra note 27, at 1089.
140. Compare ALA. CODE § 26-10A-13 (2008) (permitting pre-birth termination
of parental rights), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-107 (West 2008) (“[A] consent
given before seventy-two hours after the birth of the child is invalid.”). Most state
statutes are predicated upon concerns that a pre-birth consent to relinquish
parental rights cannot constitute a meaningful, or knowing consent to place a
child for adoption and terminate parental rights to that child. See N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 115-b (McKinney 2008); Matter of Guilio De Filippis v. Kirchner 217
N.Y.S.2d 145 (N.Y.App. Div. 1995) (finding that “a pre-birth consent was invalid as
it was inconsistent with the legislative objectives of protecting the natural parent
from improvidence or overreaching and insuring that a consent is a product of a
fully deliberate act.”) (citing People ex rel. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 139
N.Y.S.2d 189 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Adoption of Female Infant B v. Khatuna B., 51
N.Y.S.3d 419 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (“[F]urthermore, as in De Filippis, the
surrender agreement here was executed after the birth of the child, when
respondent had sufficient opportunity to reflect on whether she wished to cede
her parental rights. As was noted in De Filippis, a pre-birth consent is less likely to
be the result of a fully deliberate act.”).
141. The difference between the termination standards for birth mothers and
birth fathers turns on the timing and requirements of notice and/or consent to
the adoption. Compare Robert O. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99, 100 (N.Y. 1992)
(holding that an unwed father who was unaware of the pregnancy or birth of his
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to the disposition of embryos to third parties for purposes of family
building simply because forty-nine state statutes invalidate any pre142
Moreover,
birth consent to terminate their parental rights.
because embryos are clearly not considered to be children under
143
any cognizable theory, it is wholly inapposite to rely on adoption
144
statutes that apply to the placement of children.
Further complicating the application of adoption laws to the
disposition of frozen embryos to third parties are historical
presumptions (codified in most states) which recognize the woman
who gave birth to the child and her husband, if married at the time
145
Indeed,
of birth, to be the legal and natural father of the child.
this presumption has been expanded to include cases in which the
birth mother did not bear a genetic link to the child to whom she
146
and is reflected in recent changes to statutory
gave birth
147
Thus,
language regarding the presumption of parentage.
applying traditional principles of state adoption law—which
require the post-birth consent to the adoption and post-birth
termination of parental rights—has the potential to create even
child until eighteen months after the child’s birth was neither entitled to notice,
nor was his consent to the adoption required where he failed to take any steps to
discover the pregnancy or the birth of the child), and In re Cassidy YY, 802
N.Y.S.2d 520, 521–22 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (“[I]nasmuch as an unwed father must
act promptly to assert his parental rights, we affirm. Petitioner failed to manifest a
willingness to be a parent at any time during the period from conception . . . until
. . . after the adoption. . . . [P]etitioner does not allege that the mother actively
concealed her pregnancy from him, and he . . . made no effort to contact the
mother following their months of sexual intercourse to inquire as to the possibility
that their relationship had resulted in a child.”), and In re Baby Girl U, 638
N.Y.S.2d 253, 255 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (“[E]ven if we were to accept respondent’s
contention that his failure to act was due to the actions of the mother, and he was
therefore excused from satisfying the six-month time requirement, we find that
Family Court correctly concluded that respondent failed to engage in any conduct
indicative of a manifestation of parental responsibility.”), with 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 2511, 2513, 2711, 2714 (2008) (stating that a birth father must be notified of a
pending adoption and his consent is unnecessary only if his parental rights have
been previously terminated).
142. Kindregan & McBrien, Assisted Reproductive Technology, supra note 13.
143. See supra Part I.
144. See id.
145. E.g., Kindregan & McBrien, Assisted Reproductive Technology, supra note 13.
146. McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 479–80 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)
(holding the mother who conceived via egg donation to be legal and natural
mother of the children conceived, even though she did not provide the eggs)
(citing Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993)).
147. Id.; N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney Supp. 2008) (changing the word
“natural” child to “birth” child); Id. § 24 (substituting “birth parents” for “natural
parents”).
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greater instability and risk than exists in a traditional domestic
adoption. While all adoptive parents assume some risk that the
birth parents may choose to parent the child they conceived, there
are clearly defined statutory limits on the right of a birth parent to
revoke consent to an adoption.
For example, in a New York private-placement adoption, a
birth mother who executes an Extra Judicial Consent to the
adoption of her baby has forty-five days in which to revoke that
148
This is based on a “common-law presumption favoring
consent.
149
New York further
the biological parents’ rights to custody . . . .”
recognizes that the woman who gave birth to a child and her
husband are the legal and natural parents of any child born during
their marriage regardless of whether they are genetically related to
150
These two presumptions, whether legislative or based
that child.
on common law, are becoming increasingly difficult to reconcile,
especially in the context of an embryo adoption.
Using New York law as an example, applying its parental
151
termination laws and its presumption of maternity and paternity
to an embryo “adoption” might result in the legal nightmare of
having, at the time of the child’s birth, four legally recognized
parents of the once cryogenically preserved embryo. That is, the
recipient or intended parents who successfully gestated and
delivered the newborn, if married at the time of birth, will be
presumed to be the legal and natural parents of the child under
152
Simultaneously, the genetic parents (who in a
New York law.
conventional adoption scenario stand in the shoes of the birth
mother and father), have not yet been able to statutorily terminate
their parental rights and have the benefit of a well established
presumption in favor of retaining custody of their biological
153
If that newborn were to have a life-threatening illness
child.
148. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-b.
149. People ex rel. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 530 N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1988).
150. E.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (as amended July 21, 2008) (“[A]ny child
born to a married woman by means of artificial insemination . . . shall be deemed
the legitimate birth child of the husband and his wife for all purposes.”);
McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 480 (holding gestational mother who gave birth from
donated eggs was the natural mother of her children).
151. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 24, 73 (see commentary to section 73 by Alan D.
Schienkman, recognizing the strong common law presumption of legitimacy of
children born to a married woman).
152. Id. § 24
153. See, e.g., Kindregan, supra note 14, at 50; see People ex rel. Anonymous v.
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there are potentially four legally recognized “parents” who have
decision-making power regarding that newborn’s medical care.
Equally frightening is the prospect that when applying the
traditional adoption model, under New York Law the
recipient/intended parents could carry the pregnancy to term and
deliver the child, only to face the genetic parents’ sudden change
of heart, assertion of their genetic link, and a lack of termination of
154
their parental rights, creating a contested adoption.
Thus, the application of adoption law is not only inapposite
but creates a complicated legal quagmire of potential issues for a
court to resolve in the inevitable instance in which an embryo
adoption is contested.
Although analogous to a surrogacy dispute, it is unclear
whether existing case law which has been applied in surrogacy
155
contests and which looks to the parties’ intent at the time the
surrogacy was entered into in order to establish parentage will be
sufficiently persuasive enough to override decades of public policy
156
Indeed,
seeking to preserve the parental rights of birth parents.
following either of the fact patterns presented above and applying
New York law, both sets of parents likely would be afforded some
form of protected legal rights as parents to the child conceived
from the embryo adoption. In Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court was forced to address
competing claims for parentage that resulted from the mis157
implantation of embryos created during IVF.
In the spring of 1998, plaintiffs Deborah Perry-Rogers and her
husband Robert underwent an IVF cycle at a clinic in New York
158
At the same time, defendants Donna and Richard Fasano
City.
were also undergoing IVF treatment at the same clinic.
Unbeknownst to both parties, when transferring the Fasano’s
Anonymous, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 615 (discussing historical presumption in favor of
birth parents).
154. Compare N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 with N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-b.
155. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998); In re Marriage of Witten,
672 N.W.2d 768, 777 (Iowa 2003).
156. See, e.g., Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19, 24 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000);
Robert B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (adhering to
the California Supreme Court’s determination that there can be only one natural
mother to a child); see also People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption
Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185 (1971), cert. denied sub nom, DeMartino v. Scarpetta, 404 US
805 (1971)).
157. 715 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
158. Id.
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embryos into Donna Fasano’s uterus, the IVF clinic inadvertently
159
Shortly
included embryos belonging to the Perry-Rogerses.
thereafter the clinic notified both couples of the mistake and
160
advised them to undergo genetic and amniocentesis testing.
Upon learning of the mix-up, the Perry-Rogerses immediately
161
attempted to contact the Fasanos.
The following December, Donna Fasano delivered two healthy
162
One baby, who was Caucasian, was
baby boys of different races.
163
The other
determined to be the genetic child of the Fasanos.
boy, Akiel, who was African-American, was subsequently
164
The
determined to be the genetic child of the Perry-Rogerses.
Fasanos took no action regarding the apparent error nor did they
respond to the Perry-Rogers’ attempts at contact until the PerryRogerses commenced a lawsuit against them and the fertility
165
clinic. The Perry-Rogerses alleged, inter alia, medical malpractice
against the clinic and sought a declaratory judgment regarding the
parties’ rights, obligations, and genetic relationship with respect to
166
The Perry-Rogerses sought full custody of Akiel based on
Akiel.
167
The
the fact that the Fasanos were “genetic strangers” to him.
Fasanos sought visitation based on a prior agreement between the
168
parties.
In reversing the initial award of custody to the Fasanos and
directing further proceedings to establish the Perry-Rogeres’ legal
parentage of Akiel, the Appellate Division noted:
[O]n this issue we will not simply adopt the Rogerses’
suggestion that no gestational mother may ever claim
visitation with the infant she carried in view of her status a
“genetic stranger” to the infant. In recognition of current
reproductive technology, the term “genetic stranger”
alone can no longer be enough to end a discussion of this
issue. Additional consideration may be relevant for an
initial threshold analysis of who is, or may be, a

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22–23.
Id. at 22.
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169

“parent.”
Noting that the laws of the State of New York traditionally
distinguish “natural parents” from adoptive, step, or foster parents,
the court reasoned that advances in reproductive technologies
created new legal issues revolving around the definition of the term
170
The court thus undertook a brief survey of cases with
“mother.”
171
similar or instructive fact patterns.
The Perry-Rogers court first discussed the seminal California
172
case of Johnson v. Calvert, in which a gestational carrier refused to
relinquish custody of a child she carried for another couple and to
173
The California Supreme
whom she had no genetic connection.
Court in Johnson relied on the parties’ intent as expressed in a
surrogacy contract and awarded custody of the child to its genetic
174
The Johnson court noted that in defining the term
parents.
“mother,” “when the two means do not coincide in one woman, she
who intended to procreate the child—that is, she who intended to
bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her
175
own—is the natural mother under California law.”
The Perry-Rogers court next turned its attention to a 1994 New
176
York case, McDonald v. McDonald, involving a divorce dispute
regarding the custody of children conceived during the course of
177
The
the marriage and through the assistance of an egg donor.
McDonald court applied the intent analysis set forth in Johnson and
found the mother to be the legal and natural mother, rejecting the
father’s position that only a genetic parent and natural parent has a
178
superior claim to custody.
Thus, the court in Perry-Rogers noted that under an intent
analysis:
[I]t is apparent . . . that a “gestational mother” may
possess enforceable rights under the law, despite her
being a “genetic stranger” to the child. Given the
complex possibilities in these kind of circumstances, it is
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
at 24).
177.
178.

Id. at 23 (citation omitted).
Id. at 23–24.
Id. at 24.
851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (cited in Perry-Rogers, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 24).
Id. at 778.
Id. at 782.
Id.
608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (cited in Perry-Rogers, 715 N.Y.S.2d
Id. at 478.
Id. at 480.
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simply inappropriate to render any determination solely
as a consequence of genetics. . . . . [I]t is worth noting that
even if the Fasanos had claimed the right to custody of the
child, application of the “intent” analysis . . . would—in
our view—require that custody be awarded to the
Rogerses. It was they who purposefully arranged for their
genetic material to be taken and used in order to attempt
179
to create their own child, whom they intended to rear.
The court, however, noted in dicta that there might be
circumstances in which both a genetic mother and a gestational
mother would have competing interests in being declared parents,
and the court would have to treat both the genetic and gestational
180
mother as parents.
It is thus clear, following established case law which attempts to
resolve competing claims of parentage and conflicting and
inconsistent state statutes, that there is no clear resolution to the
issue of what will happen in the inevitable event that an embryo
adoption is contested. Indeed, application of the intent analysis set
forth above may be inappropriate in an embryo adoption. Two
commentators have each posited two perhaps seemingly
contradictory reasons why the intent theory for resolving embryo
adoption disputes is unworkable. One commentator, Jessica
Lambert, has noted that it is not an appropriate legal analysis,
“because ‘adopting’ a[n] . . . embryo is unlikely to be seen as the
equivalent of bringing about the conception and birth of a
181
Another commentator, Charles Kindregan, has aptly
child.”
pointed out that it is difficult to apply the intent standard when
179. Perry-Rogers, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
180. Id. at 25 n.1 (discussing possibility for both parties in a lesbian couple to
be declared the child’s mother, where a biological parent might be entitled to
visitation notwithstanding having placed child for adoption, and finding Fasano’s
nominal parental relationship over Akiel should have been corrected before the
development of a parental relationship with him). The facts presented bore more
similarity to cases involving a mix-up of newborn infants in a hospital nursery,
which the court noted should be corrected immediately, as compared to one in
which a “gestational mother has arguably the same rights to claim parentage as the
genetic mother. Under such circumstances, the Fasanos will not be heard to claim
the status of parents . . . .” Id. at 25.
181. Lambert, supra note 20, at 569 (noting in contrast to a surrogacy dispute
that in the “embryo donation context the recipient couple has neither
orchestrated the creation of the embryo nor initiated the implantation of it.”
There is thus more difficulty applying the same “reasoning of intended
parenthood to impose legal parental rights (and the resulting burdens of
unwanted parenthood that are the focus of the balancing test) in the embryo
donation context . . . .”).
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each party to an embryo adoption at some point sought to become
182
a parent.
Of additional concern would be the possibility that a court
might apply the best interests standard normally utilized to resolve
contested adoptions. As at least one commentator has pointed out:
[W]hen frozen embryos are bestowed with the rights of
personhood it effectively confers upon them more rights
than developing fetuses. Given the political and legal
ramifications of affording an embryo rights that would
provide a corresponding limitation on procreative liberty
of the potential parents . . . [it] would be ill-advised to
adopt a “best interests” standard for cases regarding
183
disputes over embryos.
It is thus clear that the adoption paradigm for disposition of
cryopreserved embryos to third parties is inapposite for numerous
reasons.
Traditional adoption laws pertaining to the
relinquishment of parental rights simply cannot be applied in a
pre-birth context.
Furthermore, public policies favoring
recognition of the parent who gives birth as the legal parent, in
contrast to the relinquishment standard, clearly places the parties
to an embryo adoption at odds. Both have recognizable rights that
potentially come into play in a contested embryo adoption. If the
contested embryo adoption were to take place pre-birth when
parentage issues are even murkier, traditional notions regarding
the protection of children—a category to which embryos cannot be
assigned—may require the application of the “best interests”
standard to protect the embryo. This is even more likely to happen
in a jurisdiction that favors the “special respect” standard
established in Davis. Providing rights of personhood to the embryo
in a contested adoption directly pits the embryo against the
procreative rights of all four potential parents. “Simply calling
embryo donation ‘embryo adoption’ does not, and cannot, make it
fit within those legal constructs, and legal commentators,
consumers, and ethicists have all questioned the apparent bias and
potential erosion of procreative and abortion rights reflected in
184
this initiative.”

182.
183.
184.

Kindregan, Collaborative Reproduction, supra note 13, at 53.
Lambert, supra note 20, at 556–57.
Crockin, “What is an Embryo?”, supra note 27, at 1184.
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V. EMBRYO DONATION BY CONTRACT AND STATUTE: THE ONLY
WORKABLE SOLUTION
It is evident that the misuse of terminology has created larger
issues than the actual application of the adoption paradigm to the
disposition of cryopreserved embryos to third parties for purposes
of conception. Whether this is an intentional effort to buttress prolife arguments and undermine procreative autonomy established in
185
186
Roe v. Wade, or simply due to confusion or a lack of awareness
187
of the complexities of the issues presented, it is critical that the
legal and scientific communities resolve these issues.
The very advantages sought to be achieved through the use of
frozen embryos for family building by third parties—an affordable
means of building a family, control over the pregnancy, the ability
to experience pregnancy and childbirth, together with the
potential finality of the process with no concerns about a birth
parent coming back and asserting parental rights—initially made
188
embryo donation an exciting opportunity for infertile families.
These goals are all undermined by the application of principles of
adoption. Indeed, the requirement that an infertile couple
undergo a home study (a mechanism usually utilized by the state to
protect the best interests of a child—a category this article has
previously determined is inapplicable to frozen embryos), child
abuse clearances, and background checks is not only burdensome
but also sets apart the recipient parent from other infertile patients
undergoing third party assisted reproduction. There is no logical
reason to require the recipient of a frozen embryo to jump over
additional hurdles that individuals who are building their families
189
through egg and sperm donation are not required to undertake.
185. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note 12, at 611,
623; Kindregan & McBrien, Embryo Donation, supra note 20, at 188.
186. See Lambert, supra note 20, at 550–51 (discussing confusion in
terminology that may affect a court’s determination of parental rights and
responsibilities).
187. See Kindregan & McBrien, Embryo Donation, supra note 20, at 176 (noting
that physicians have been transferring embryos between consenting parties
without concern for legal considerations).
188. See Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note 12, at 616–17; see also Nightlite
Christian Adoptions, supra note 66.
189. The author in no way means to assert that psychological counseling is not
appropriate. Indeed, it is the author’s belief that the psychological counseling
offered to recipients of other types of third party assisted reproduction serves to
protect the same interests, education, awareness, and resolution of grief regarding
the underlying infertility is entirely appropriate to any person choosing third party
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Moreover, requiring recipient families to participate in an
unnecessary and burdensome process in order to participate in a
form of assisted reproduction, which has a low success rate, instead
serves to promote two undesirable goals. First, it drives up the cost
of what is otherwise one of the more affordable forms of third party
assisted reproduction. Second, it sets up the recipient or intended
parent for severe disappointment. By establishing presumptions
and creating discussions regarding the inevitability of
parenthood—as is the normal dialogue in an adoption home
study—the recipient/intended parent may begin to assume that
the frozen embryo transfer will result in a pregnancy when statistics
190
do not bear out that probability.
Although there are some 400,000 cryopreserved embryos is the
191
United States, due to regulations governing the donation of
human tissue promulgated by the U.S. Food and Drug
192
Administration, it has been estimated that only 2% (or eight
thousand) of those frozen embryos are realistically available for
donation or adoption for purposes of a third party’s family
193
The likelihood that any given recipient of an embryo
building.
donation/adoption will conceive is much lower than with a
194
While success
standard fresh (non-frozen) transfer of embryos.
rates for fresh IVF transfers consistently approach 50%, the average
195
live birth rate for frozen embryo transfers is approximately 30%.
Indeed, the limited number of frozen embryos actually available for
196
transfer to recipient parents, combined with the lower success
assisted reproduction.
190. See Angela Woodall, Embryo “Adoption” Program Gives Hope to Infertile
Couples, OAKLAND TRIB. Dec. 26, 2004 (“[T]hey must understand not all the
embryos turn into babies.”) (quoting Arthur Caplan, Chairman of the Department
of Medical Ethics and Director of the Center for Bioethics, University of
Pennsylvania)); Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note 12, at 630 (noting that three
out of four embryos are lost during the natural process of conception).
191. Hoffman et al., supra note 15, at 1068.
192. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 1271.80, 1271.85, 1271.90 (2008).
193. Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note 12, at 609.
194. According to 2006 statistics reported by the Centers for Disease Control,
success rates for non-ovum donor fresh IVF cycles in women under 35 (based on
national averages) is 44.9%, compared to success rates for frozen embryo cycles in
the same group of patients of 33.1%. SARTCORS ONLINE, CLINIC SUMMARY
REPORT:
ALL SART MEMBER CLINICS, available at https://www.sartcors
online.com/rptCSR_ PublicMultYrear.aspx?ClinicPKID+0 (last visited Dec. 31,
2008) (on file with author).
195. Id.
196. According to one study, 71% of patients change their mind about
donating their frozen embryos to third parties. Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra
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rates for this technology when compared to other forms of third
party assisted reproduction like egg and sperm donation, has
resulted in a limited number of facilities or organizations actually
197
conducting embryo donation/adoptions in the United States.
The cost for an embryo donation/adoption, however, is much
lower than for any other form of assisted reproduction and
adoption, thus still making it an attractive alternative to many
198
infertile families.
Indeed, should resolution of the legal
ambiguities surrounding embryo adoption/donation be resolved, it
may become a more popular means of family building for more
people.
It is clear, however, that the limited number of embryos
available for donation/adoption has negatively impacted what was
199
initially thought to be a potentially explosive new business.
Frozen embryo banks and agencies routinely fail due to the limited
supply of frozen embryos and the complexities presented by federal
200
Although significantly promoted and endorsed by
and state law.
201
the Bush Administration, and despite federal funding, there are
very few viable places to go if one is interested in participating in an
embryo donation/adoption. Very few infertility clinics report
having active embryo donation/adoption programs, leaving the
potential consumer/recipient parent to work with a select few
embryo adoption agencies, privately through attorneys, or
202
Of those agencies
sometimes independently on the Internet.
note 12, at 615 (citing Susan C. Klock et al., Correspondence, The Disposition of
Unused Frozen Embryos, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 69 (2001)).
197. See Crockin, The Embryo Wars, supra note 12, at 616 (“[I]n practice, the
volume interest in this option never materialized for multiple, unanticipated
reasons.”).
198. Id.
199. See id. at 616–17.
200. Indeed, the 2005 promulgation of FDA regulations, designed to ensure
that embryos and other cellular-based matter created through the donation of
human ova and/or sperm were free of infectious disease, resulted in making most,
if not all, of the embryos created prior to effective date of the regulations
ineligible for embryo donation/adoption. That is, most embryos which were
created from donor egg or sperm, or which will be donated themselves, did not
undergo the intensive screening mandated by the FDA in order to make them
eligible for donation. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.80 (2008).
201. The embryo adoption program Snowflakes is federally funded. Crockin,
The Embryo Wars, supra note 12, at 616, 623; see also Nightlite Christian Adoptions,
supra note 66.
202. Elissa K. Zirinsky, Adoption’s New Frontier, CBS NEWS.COM, July 28, 2005,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/07/28/national/main712541.shtml?sourc
e=search story (discussing how one couple found an embryo donor on a message

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009

33

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 1

522

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:2

conducting embryo donation/adoption there are only a handful
with active programs, including The National Embryo Donation
203
Center, Snowflakes (a division of Nightlight Christian Adoptions)
and relative newcomers such as Adoptions From The Heart.
In contrast to the difficulties embryo adoption/donation
agencies are having in establishing a foothold in the world of
reproductive technology and business, egg donation agencies
abound. This is due largely in part to the ease with which an egg
donation may be implemented from a legal perspective. Many
state statutes present a workable model for absolving egg donors of
204
205
Whether it is through a direct statute or
parental rights.
206
reasoning by analogy based on a sperm donation statute, the
termination of parental rights of an egg donor is easily undertaken
through contract and with statutory support. Similarly, gestational
carrier agreements, when supported by statutes, readily protect the
parental interests of the recipient/intended parents to the baby
207
It is these models that are best utilized
carried by a third party.
and adapted to embryo disposition to third parties if it is going to
become a popular means of family building. Agencies and clinics
that are reluctant to step into this business likely are reluctant to do
so because of the lack of guidance from the law and the ambiguity
regarding the definition of the embryo.

board posted on www.ivfconnections.com); Liza Mundy, Out of The Freezer, Into the
Family: The Booming, and Bizarre, Business of Embryo Adoption, SLATE, May 31, 2005,
http://www.slate.com/id/2119845/ (discussing matching recipient and donating
families on a Yahoo message board).
203. See, e.g., Batsedis, supra note 32, at 569; see also Crockin, The Embryo Wars,
supra note 12, at 623–24 (discussing federal funding of Snowflakes by Bush
Adminsitration).
204. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-775 (Supp. 2008) (“[A]n identified or
anonymous donor of sperm or eggs used in [artificial insemination with donor
sperm or eggs], or any person claiming by or through such donor, shall not have
any right or interest in any child born as a result of [artificial insemination with
donor sperm or eggs].”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-102(8) (Supp. 2006) (‘Donor’
means an individual who produces eggs or sperm used for assisted reproduction,
whether or not for consideration. The term does not include: (i) A husband who
provides sperm, or a wife who provides eggs, to be used for assisted reproduction
by the wife; (ii) A woman who gives birth to a child by means of assisted
reproduction, or (iii) a parent under subchapter VII of this chapter). “A donor is
not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.” Id. § 8-702
(2004).
205. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-207.
206. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney Supp. 2008).
207. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/1–75 (West Supp. 2008).
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is incumbent upon legal practitioners and jurists to
recognize the appropriate definition of an embryo, as cellular
matter subject to disposition under a property or contract theory of
law, and for state legislatures to provide coherent structures for the
legal transfer of embryos to third parties along with parental rights
to the recipient parents. States such as Texas and Oklahoma,
together with the Uniform Parentage Act and the American Bar
Association’s Model Act on Assisted Reproductive Technologies,
provide good examples of statutory frameworks that enable a
workable structure for embryo donation.
It is time to abandon outdated and inapposite terminology.
Adoption is not an appropriate or justifiable paradigm for the
disposition of frozen embryos for purposes of conception. Rather,
a consistent and meaningful standard can be found through the
application of contract and property law together with clear
guidance from legislatures. Through the proper application of the
law and consistent use of appropriate terminology, embryo
donation can become more popular and provide an affordable and
workable alternative for many socially and medically infertile
people in the United States.
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